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Abstract
Although a growing body of evidence suggests that publicly disclosing information about plants’
environmental performance can motivate emissions reductions, this phenomenon remains poorly
understood.  To help fill this gap, this paper presents original data from a survey of plants participating in
the Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation and Rating (PROPER), Indonesia’s widely-acclaimed
public disclosure program.  These data suggest that a key means by which PROPER spurs abatement is
improving factory managers’ information about their own plants’ emissions and abatement opportunities.
This finding contrasts with the prevailing view in the literature that public disclosure enhances pressures
to abate placed on firms by external agents such as community groups and shareholders.  But our data
also suggest that PROPER’s “environmental audit” effect operates in concert with external pressures.
Therefore, simply supplying new information to plant managers without making that information public
may not be sufficient to motivate significant abatement.
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1.  Introduction
Public disclosure—the regular collection and dissemination of information about firms’
environmental performance—has been characterized as the “third wave” in environmental
regulation, after command-and-control and market-based approaches (Tietenberg 1998).  Its
growing popularity is partly due to evidence that pioneering programs like the United States’
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) have had a significant impact on pollution abatement.  Just as
important, public disclosure imposes a minimal burden on regulators.  It does not necessarily
require an effective enforcement capability or even a well-defined set of environmental
regulations.  The costs of the administrative activities it does require—data collection and
dissemination—appear to be falling due to new information technologies.  As a result, public
disclosure holds particular promise for developing countries where environmental regulatory
institutions are chronically short of funding, expertise and political support.  It is also attractive
as a complement to conventional regulatory instruments in industrialized countries, especially for
types of pollution (like toxics) that have yet to be strictly controlled.
Although policy makers are increasingly embracing public disclosure, we still know
relatively little about how it motivates firms to cut emissions.  The thin literature on the topic
suggests that public disclosure enhances pressures placed on firms by a variety of private- and
public-sector agents including community groups, consumers, financial markets, and state
regulators.  But little research has been done to identify which of these—or other—factors drive
improvements in environmental performance.  Such research could help policy makers design
more efficient and effective public disclosure programs.
To help fill this gap, this paper presents original data from a survey of plants participating
in the Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation and Rating (PROPER), Indonesia’s widely
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acclaimed public disclosure pollution control program.  The survey data suggest that a key
means by which PROPER spurs abatement is improving factory managers’ information about
their own plants’ pollution and abatement opportunities.  But our data also suggest that this
“environmental audit effect” operates in concert with external pressures.  Therefore, simply
supplying new information to plant managers without making that information public may not be
sufficient to motivate significant abatement.
The paper is organized as follows.  The second section reviews the literature.  The third
section develops an analytical model to demonstrate how public disclosure, operating through
the various channels discussed in the literature, can affect a firm’s abatement decisions.  The
fourth and fifth sections provide background on PROPER and discuss its impact on pollution
abatement.  The sixth section presents the survey data and the last section concludes.
2.   Literature
Tietenberg (1998) reviews the thin but quickly growing economics literature on public
disclosure.  He identifies seven “channels” through which public disclosure of reliable
information about firms’ environmental performance can affect their behavior.  Specifically,
public disclosure may
•  affect the demand for firms’ goods;
•  affect the demand for firms’ stock;
•  affect firms’ ability to hire and retain employees;
•  convince private citizens to initiate tort law actions against polluters;
•  build support for new pollution control legislation;
•  motivate private suits—both “citizen suits” and “complaint actions”—to force firms
to undertake abatement; and
•  give rise to judicial actions in countries like Colombia, Ecuador and Chile where the
constitution guarantees citizens the right to a healthy environment.
The empirical literature on public disclosure has mainly focused on the second channel—capital
markets.  While this research clearly shows that public disclosure can affect stock prices (e.g.,
Laplante and Lanoi 1994; Badrinath and Bolster 1996; Hamilton 1995; Arora 1999), it is less
clear that changes in stock prices can, in turn, affect firms’ pollution control activities.  However,
Konar and Cohen (1997a) and Khanna, Quimio and Bojilova (1998) suggest that they can.Resources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
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Although economics research on public disclosure per se is limited, the more extensive
literatures on “voluntary regulation” and “informal regulation” are quite relevant.  Both
literatures focus on explaining why firms voluntarily overcomply with regulatory standards:  the
literature on voluntary regulation concerns over-compliance with de jure regulatory standards in
industrialized countries (see Lyon and Maxwell, 1999 for a review), while the literature on
informal regulation mainly concerns over-compliance with lax de facto regulatory standards in
developing countries.  For the most part, explanations proposed in these literatures concern the
same pressures discussed in the literature on public disclosure including those generated by
consumer demand, capital markets, and labor markets.
A common theme in the literature on voluntary regulation is that firms may over-comply
with existing regulations to preempt or weaken future regulation, or to affect the monitoring and
enforcement of existing regulation.  Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (1998) construct a model in
which consumer lobbying spurs environmental regulation.  Effective lobbying requires
consumers to acquire information on environmental issues.  When information costs are low, the
threat of regulation is high; as a result, firms may try to pre-empt new regulation by voluntarily
undertaking abatement.  Hence, government actions like public disclosure that significantly
reduce information costs spur abatement.  Maxwell and Decker (1998) develop a model in which
firms voluntarily cut emissions, not to pre-empt future legislation, but to reduce how intensely
existing regulations are enforced.  Decker (1999) provides empirical support for this model.  He
finds that firms with lower TRI releases per unit output are in fact subject to fewer inspections,
all other things equal.
Regarding the link between consumers and environmental performance, Arora and
Gangopadhayay (1995) show that firms may overcomply with environmental regulations to
attract “green consumers.”  The empirical evidence to support this proposition is mixed.  While
Arora and Cason (1996) and Khanna and Damon (1998) show that firms that have more contact
with final consumers are more likely to participate in a voluntary program to reduce TRI
emissions (the 33/50 program), Arora and Cason (1995) and Konar and Cohen (1997b) are not
able to replicate this result.1
                                                
1 The existence of markets for “green electricity” (power generated by renewables and priced higher than
conventionally generated electricity) as well as for “green mutual funds” suggests that consumer demand affects
environmental performance.Resources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
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As for the link between judicial action and environmental performance, Khanna and
Quimio (2000) find a significant relationship between the threat of future liability (measured by
the number of Superfund sites for which a firm is the potentially responsible party) and voluntary
environmental performance (measured by the number of corporate environmental practices it
adopts).  Khanna and Damon (1998) investigate the impact of industry associations on
environmental performance—a channel for non-regulatory pressure not discussed by Tietenberg
(1998).  They find that firms belonging to the Chemical Manufacturers Association are more
likely to join the 33/50 program, all other things equal.
The literature on informal regulation focuses on pressures to abate generated by private-
sector agents in developing countries where state regulators are weak.  Most of this research
entails cross-sectional, plant-level econometric analysis of the determinants of environmental
performance.  For example, Pargal and Wheeler (1996) examine the relationship between
Indonesian plants’ emissions of  water pollutants and the characteristics of the surrounding
community.  They find that plants in communities with higher per capita income and higher
levels of education have lower emissions, all other things equal, implying that such communities
effectively pressure plants to abate.  Using data on Mexican firms, Dasgupta, Hettige and
Wheeler (2000) find that firms that are publicly traded, have more highly educated workers, and
have adopted ISO14001-type internal management procedures are more likely to be in
compliance with environmental regulations, all other things equal. These findings imply that
shareholders, employees, and international certification programs can motivate firms to cut
emissions.  Finally, using data on small-scale Mexican brick kilns, Blackman and Bannister
(1998) find that lower emissions are correlated with, among other things, pressure applied by
industry and neighborhood organizations.
3.  Analytical model
The following simple model of a plant’s pollution abatement decision formalizes the
foregoing discussion of the channels through which public disclosure operates.  In addition,
anticipating our survey results, we allow that public disclosure may spur abatement by lowering
marginal abatement costs.
To focus attention on pollution abatement, we assume that the plant makes production
and abatement decisions sequentially.  First it chooses a level of output, q, and a vector of levels
of financial and human capital, k.  Subsequently, it chooses a level of abatement, α , treating both
q and k as fixed.  We model the plant’s second stage abatement decision only.  The plant chooses
α  to maximize profit, π , given by,Resources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
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() [] () []() () d , H d , d t , C q d , g P α − α − α − α = π k W
where,
      ()()()()()() () d , j d , a d , m d , n d , c d , r d , H α + α + α + α + α + α = α
and,
P(·)is the equilibrium price of output
g is an index of green consumerism—the sensitivity of P to the plant’s emissions
d is a measure of the public disclosure of information about the plant’s emissions
q is the quantity of output
C(·) is the cost of abatement 
t is the plant’s information about abatement technologies and its own emissions
W(·) is a vector of the costs of two types of capital: financial and human
k is a vector of two types of capital: financial and human
H(·) is the total cost of the plants’ emissions generated by external agents
r(·) is costs generated by formal regulatory authorities
c(·) is costs generated by communities
n(·) is costs generated by non-governmental organizations
m(·)is costs generated by the media
a(·) is costs generated by industry associations, and
j(·)is costs generated by courts
We make the following assumptions about the price and cost functions:  the stronger is green
consumerism, the lower is the equilibrium price the plant receives for its output (P is decreasing
in g);2 the less the plant abates and the more the public knows about its emissions, the stronger is
green consumerism (g is decreasing in α  and increasing in d), the higher are the costs of financial
                                                
2  To keep the exposition simple, we implicitly assume that the plant is an inherently dirty one—for example, an
aged coal-fired power plant—so that regardless of its choice of α , green consumerism always reduces equilibrium
price.  We could just as easily assume the plant is an inherently clean one whose equilibrium price is always
increased by green consumerism.  Allowing green consumerism to increase or decrease equilibrium price depending
on the plant’s choice of α  makes the model needlessly complex given our limited goal of illustrating how various
channels discussed in the literature operate.Resources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
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and human capital (W is decreasing in α  and is increasing in d), and the greater are the costs
imposed on the plant by external agents (r, c, n, m, a, and j are all decreasing in α  and increasing
in d); and the less the plant abates and the more information it has about its emissions and
abatement technologies, the lower is the marginal cost of abatement (C is increasing in α  and
decreasing in t).  Finally, we make the reasonable assumptions that abatement has a diminishing
marginal impact on green consumerism, capital costs and costs imposed by external agents, and
that it has an increasing marginal impact on abatement costs (g, W, H and C are all convex in
abatement).



























       (1)
The first term in parentheses represents the marginal benefit of abatement due to:  an increase in
equilibrium price of output (the first term in the parentheses); a reduction in the costs of labor
and capital (the second term); and a reduction in costs imposed by formal regulatory authorities,
communities, non-governmental organizations, the media, industry associations and the courts
(the third term).  We will refer to the sum of these three terms as the marginal abatement benefit
(MAB).  The last term in (1) is the marginal abatement cost (MAC).   The plant chooses α * such
that MAB is equated to MAC.
Using (1), it is straightforward to show that the total derivative of α * with respect to d is
unambiguously negative.  Therefore, public disclosure will increase abatement.  Figure 1 makes
this point graphically.  Given our assumptions on P(·), C(·), W(·), and H(·), the MAC schedule is
increasing in α  and the MAB schedule is decreasing in α .  The plant chooses the level of
emissions where these schedules intersect.  An increase in d will cause t(·) to increase and the
MAC schedule to shift down.  It will also cause g(·), W(·), and H(·) to increase and the MAB
schedule to shift up.  Each of these shifts will cause α * to increase.
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Figure 1.  Marginal abatement cost (MAC) and marginal abatement benefit (MAB) schedules;
optimal abatement level, αααα *
4.  PROPER
In Indonesia, rapid industrialization, population growth, and urbanization have created
severe pollution problems.  Although the country has had a command-and-control regulatory
system in place since the early 1980s, compliance has been limited, mainly because enforcement
has been virtually nonexistent (Afsah and Vincent 1997).  In 1995, Indonesia’s Environmental
Impact and Management Agency (BAPEDAL) established PROPER, to overcome pervasive
institutional barriers to enforcement.  The idea was to “create incentives for compliance throughResources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
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honor and shame” (Afsah and Ratunanda 1999).  Although only five years old, PROPER is
already being widely imitated.4
PROPER employs a color-based single-index rating system.  Individual plants are
assigned one of five ratings—black, red, blue, green and gold—based on their compliance or
over-compliance with command-and-control emissions standards (Table 1).  This rating system
was designed to be simple enough to be easily understood by the public but precise enough to
provide incentives for firms to move from one category to the next.  The exact criteria for each
rating are well-defined and relatively simple (see Afsah and Ratunanda 1999).  To minimize both
error and discretion, BAPEDAL uses a computerized management and information system to
determine ratings.
Table 1. PROPER ratings criteria
Rating Criteria
Gold Levels of pollution control for air and hazardous waste similar to that for water; extensive
use of clean technology; pollution prevention; recycling, etc.
Green Emissions less than 50% of regulatory standard; proper disposal of wastes; good
housekeeping; accurate emissions records; reasonable maintenance of a waste water
treatment system.
Blue Emissions below regulatory standard.
Red Some pollution control effort but emissions exceed regulatory standard.
Black Either no effort to control pollution or responsible for serious environmental damage.
In developing its first set of ratings, BAPEDAL relied on plant-level data from pre-
existing voluntary pollution control programs, self-reported survey data, and inspection data.
Subsequently, ratings have been based on monthly emissions reports filed by participating plants.
Emissions reports are checked against past reports and against the current reports of similar
plants.  When discrepancies arise, BAPEDAL conducts inspections to resolve them.  In 1995,
1996, and 1997 BAPEDAL conducted approximately 200 inspections of PROPER plants per
year (Afsah, Dasgupta, and Ratunanda, 1998).
                                                
4 The Philippines introduced a similar program called EcoWatch in 1997.  See
www.worldbank.org/nipr/ecowatch/ecowatch2.htm.  Preparations for PROPER-like programs are also underway in
China, Mexico, India, Colombia, Bangladesh, and Thailand.Resources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
9
Participation in PROPER is limited to several hundred relatively large water polluters.
BAPEDAL chose to focus on water pollution because it has much less experience with air
pollution and hazardous waste, pollutants for which implementing regulations were only
introduced in the mid-1990s.5
BAPEDAL’s first round of ratings, in June 1995, was carefully orchestrated.  To enhance
transparency and credibility, ratings were screened by an advisory committee which included
representatives of environmental non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders.  Also,
to give firms an opportunity to improve their performance prior to public disclosure, the names
of plants rated black, red, and blue were not released to the public until December.
BAPEDAL attempts to ensure that both participating firms and the public have easy
access to ratings.  Typically, ratings are released at a formal press conference and posted on the
Internet.6  In addition, for each participating plant, BAPEDEL issues a one-page report on
environmental performance (see Figure 2).  This report serves as an information resource for the
plant’s managers and environmental engineers.  Despite BAPEDAL’s efforts to publicize
ratings, so far only about 5% of the participants have been named in the press.
One hundred and eighty seven plants were selected to participate in the first two rounds
of PROPER ratings in June and December 1995.  All but 11 of these plants were selected
because they had participated in the Clean River Management Program (PROKASIH), a semi-
voluntary pollution control program established in 1989.7  The 11 remaining plants volunteered
to participate in PROPER.  There have been two additional ratings since December 1995—in
October 1996 and July 1997.  Seventy-five plants joined the program during this time.8
                                                
5  Plans call for PROPER to eventually be extended to cover both industrial air pollution and hazardous waste.
6 www.bapedal.go.id
7 For history and analysis of PROKASIH see Afsah, Laplante, and Makarim (1996).
8 Of the 233 plants that were participating in PROPER when our data were collected in early 1998, 158 were rated
in the first period, 187 were rated in the second period (154 of the 158 plants rated in the first period plus 33 new
plants), 102 plants were rated in the third period (all were plants that were rated in the second period), and all 233
plants were rated in the fourth period (all of the 191 plants that were rated in any of the three previous periods plus
42 new plants).Resources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
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Figure 2.  PROPER rating reportResources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
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5.  PROPER’s impact
To assess PROPER’s impact on environmental performance, we observe how
participating plants’ performance ratings changed over time.  Our sample is a subset of the 233
plants that were participating in PROPER in early 1998 when our data were collected.  Since we
require at least two ratings to assess PROPER’s impact, we eliminated 42 plants that joined the
program in July 1997 and were therefore only rated once.  In addition, for the sake of
consistency with the analysis in the next section, we eliminated 12 plants that returned
incomplete survey responses and 33 plants that returned inconsistent survey responses (we return
to the issue of the consistency of survey responses in the next section).  Thus, our sample is
comprised of 146 plants.
Table 2 gives the first rating (June or December, 1995) and the last rating (July, 1997) for
these 146 plants.  Ratings improved for over a third of the plants.9  The percentage of plants
whose rating improved—hereafter “improvers”—was much higher among plants initially rated
black and red than among plants initially rated blue and green.  Both of the two plants initially
rated black improved and 46% of the 90 plants initially rated red improved.  However, only 11%
of the 47 plants initially rated blue improved and none of the plants initially rated green
improved (BAPEDAL has yet to assign a gold rating).  The reason that plants initially rated
black and red were more likely to have improved is straightforward: for such plants, marginal
abatement costs are relatively low and the marginal benefits of improvement are relatively high.
Hence, these data strongly suggest that for plants that are not in compliance with
regulatory standards—i.e., those initially rated black or red—PROPER motivated significant
emissions reductions.  The next section presents survey data that indicates which of the channels
discussed in Sections 2 and 3 were responsible.
6.  Survey results
In the fall of 1998 we administered a survey to managers of plants participating in
PROPER that elicited their responses to the question, “How do PROPER ratings create
incentives for your firm to improve its environmental performance?”  Specifically, the survey
asked respondents to rank the importance of 18 different types of incentives for improved
                                                
9 Ratings for all but one of these improvers were non-decreasing over time.  That is, all but one were assigned a
1996 rating that was at least as high as its 1995 rating, and a 1997 rating that was at least as high as its 1996 rating.Resources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
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Table 2. 1995 and 1997 PROPER ratings
Black Red Blue Green Gold All
1995 rating 29 0 4 77 0 1 4 6
Gold 000000
Green 015309
1997 rating Blue 14 0 3 54 08 0
Red 14 67 0 05 4
Black 030003
% improvers 100 46 11 0 0 34
performance which, following Tietenberg (1998), we will call “channels” (see Table 3—note
that the second column indicates the correspondence between each channel and the variables in
the analytical model).  Respondents were asked to rank the importance of each channel on a
scale of zero (no importance) to five (extreme importance) and then to identify the first, second
and third most important channels among the group of 18.  The purpose of the first ranking was
simply to encourage respondents to think about each channel before comparing them to each
other, and also to provide a means of checking the consistency of survey responses.10
The survey results are somewhat surprising.  While the existing literature on public
disclosure and related topics has focused on sources of pressure to improve environmental
performance that are external to the firm (e.g., capital markets, the threat of future regulation,
discretionary enforcement of existing laws, and product markets), most of our respondents did
not view such channels as most important.  Rather, the majority indicated that the critical means
by which PROPER ratings spur improved performance is providing information to plant
managers and owners about their own plant’s emissions and abatement opportunities (via reports
like the one depicted in Figure 2).  Sixty percent of the respondents ranked channel t1 (PROPER
                                                
10 Survey responses were deemed inconsistent if any channel received a ranking of first, second or third most
important among the group of 18 channels but was not assigned a rank of either four or five on the scale of one to
five.Resources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
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Table 3.  How do PROPER ratings create incentives for improved environmental
performance? Survey responses and environmental performance for full sample (n = 146)
Channel Var. Description of channel in survey % respondents
ranking each









Consumers g1 Bad PROPER ratings make our firm less competitive in
international markets
63 8
g2 Bad PROPER ratings make our firm less competitive in
domestic markets
10
g3 Good PROPER ratings help to differentiate our product
from our competitors
72 0
g4 Good PROPER ratings will help in obtaining ISO 14001
certification
11 63***
Information t1 PROPER ratings provide clear information about how to
improve environmental performance
22 28
t2 PROPER ratings make owners and senior managers




k1 Bad PROPER ratings increase pressure from the
shareholders
8 73***
k2 Bad PROPER ratings make it difficult to obtain credit
from banks
20
k3 Bad PROPER ratings make it harder to get capital from
the International Finance Corporation
0—
k4 Bad PROPER ratings reduce the market value of the
company
4 67**
Human capital k5 Bad PROPER ratings increase pressure from our firm’s
employees
73 0
Regulators r1 Good PROPER ratings improve our firm’s relationship
with BAPEDAL
4 67**
r2 Good PROPER ratings will make it easier to comply
with future regulations, which will be more strict
82 7
Communities c Bad PROPER ratings increase pressure from
communities living around the factories
36 30
NGOs n Bad PROPER ratings  increase pressure from non-
governmental organizations
10 27
News Media m Bad PROPER ratings increase pressure from the news
media
25 27
Industry Assns. a Bad PROPER ratings increase pressure from industry
associations
23 3
Courts j Bad PROPER ratings increase the chances of court
action by the government
84 2
***significantly different from sample proportion (34%) at 1% level
**significantly different from sample proportion (34%) at 5% levelResources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
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ratings provide clear information about how to improve environmental performance) or channel
t2 (PROPER ratings make owners and senior managers aware of the environmental performance
of the factory) as most important or second most important.  Thus, in the eyes of most of our
survey respondents, PROPER ratings first and foremost serve as an environmental audit.
This is not to say that our survey respondents did not perceive factors external to the firm
to be important as well.  Channels ranked as first or second most important by more than 10% of
the respondents included: c (bad PROPER ratings increase pressure from communities living
around the factories) which was ranked as first or second most important by 36% of the
respondents; m (PROPER ratings increase pressure from the news media) which was ranked as
first or second most important by a quarter of the respondents; and g4 (good PROPER ratings
will help in obtaining ISO 14001 certification) which was ranked as first or second most
important by 11% of the respondents.  The last channel concerns certification of the plant’s
environmental management system by the International Standards Organization (ISO), an
endorsement that is highly valued by firms that participate in international markets or that are
seeking to do so (Dasgupta, Hettige and Wheeler 2000).11
While these data indicate which channels PROPER participants as a group perceive to be
important, they do not tell us whether these channels actually drove a third of the plants in our
sample to improve their environmental performance.  Did these plants reduce their emissions
because they obtained better information about their emissions and abatement opportunities via
PROPER reports?  Or did they reduce their emissions because of external factors such as
community pressure?  Ideally, multiple regression analysis could be used to address this
question.  But such analysis would require plant-specific measures of changes in the intensity of
each of the 18 channels due to public disclosure, i.e., for each plant, measures of the intensity of
each channel before public disclosure and after it.  Unfortunately, such data do not exist and our
survey data are an inadequate proxy.12
                                                
11 ISO 14001 certification requires the following: (i) initial review of plant conditions to identify environmental
issues of concern, (ii) establishment of priorities for action, (iii) establishment of an environmental policy statement
signed by the chief executive officer, (iii) development of performance targets based on the policy statement, (iv)
implementation of the environmental management system with defined procedures and responsibilities, and (v)
implementation reviews, performance measurement, and management audits.
12 Plants’ survey responses are not suitable proxies because they may not be exogenous to the plant’s environmental
performance.  For example, a plant’s choice of channel c as most important does not necessarily indicate that as a
result of the disclosure of PROPER ratings, this plant was subjected to particularly intense pressure from the
surrounding community independent of it’s environmental performance.  Rather, plants with continued poorResources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
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However, when combined with regulatory data on changes in PROPER ratings over time,
our survey responses can provide some clues as to which channels drove improvements in
environmental performance.  Using these two types of data, we calculate the percentage of plants
that chose each channel as first or second most important whose PROPER rating improved
during the course or their participation (see the last column in Table 3).  We then test whether
this percentage is significantly greater than the percentage of improvers in the entire sample—
34%.  A statistically significant difference indicates a simple correlation between the channel and
improved environmental performance.  We would note that like all tests for simple correlations,
this one does not control for correlations with other potential explanatory variables such as the
type and size of the plant.  Nor does it imply anything about the direction of causality.
We find statistically significant differences for four channels: g4, k1, k4 and r1.  However,
for three of these channels—k1, k4 and r1—the percentage of the sample that chose each as first
or second most important is so small—9%, 4% and 4% respectively—as to cast doubt on the
import of this finding.13  Eleven percent of the sample chose the remaining channel, g4 (good
PROPER ratings will help in obtaining ISO 14001 certification), as first or second most
important.  Almost two-thirds of these respondents were improvers.  This suggests that there may
be some synergy between public disclosure and international certification programs.  Note that
there is not a significant correlation between improved environmental performance and choosing
either of the two information channels (t1 and t2).  
But our analysis of the correlation between our respondents’ survey responses and their
environmental performance may be biased by the fact that the sample contains both plants
initially rated blue and green as well as plants initially rated black and red.  As discussed above,
fewer than 10% of the plants in the first group improved while almost half of the plants in the
second group did.  Both the marginal costs of improvement and the expected marginal benefits
of improvement (the MAC and MAB schedules) may be different for these two groups of plants,
and therefore, the drivers of improved environmental performance may also be different.  To
control for this, we split the sample into plants initially rated red or black (n = 92) and those
                                                                                                                                                            
performance after public disclosure may have been subjected to more intense community pressure, and as a result,
may have been more likely to choose this channel as most important.
13 Of the 146 plants in the sample, 11 choose k1 as first or second most important eight of which were improvers, six
plants chose k4 as first or second most important four of which were improvers, and six plants chose r1 as first or
second most important four of which were improvers.Resources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
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Table 4. How do PROPER ratings create incentives for improved environmental
performance? Survey responses and environmental performance for split sample
Channel Var. Description of channel in survey A: % respondents ranking each channel
as 1st or 2nd most important
B: % respondents ranking each channel as 








Consumers g1 Bad PROPER ratings make our firm less competitive in
international markets
5 40 63 3
g2 Bad PROPER ratings make our firm less competitive in
domestic markets
1 0 0—
g3 Good PROPER ratings help to differentiate our product
from our competitors
7 33 60
g4 Good PROPER ratings will help in obtaining ISO 14001
certification
13 75** 63 3
Information t1 PROPER ratings provide clear information about how to
improve environmental performance
23 38 19 0
t2 PROPER ratings make owners and senior managers
aware of the environmental performance of the factory
44 40 32 0*
Financial
capital
k1 Bad PROPER ratings increase pressure from the
shareholders
5 80* 13 67***
k2 Bad PROPER ratings make it difficult to obtain credit
from banks
2 0* 0—
k3 Bad PROPER ratings make it harder to get capital from
the International Finance Corporation
0 — 0—
k4 Bad PROPER ratings reduce the market value of the
company
3 33 6 100***
Human capital k5 Bad PROPER ratings increase pressure from our firm’s
employees
4 75 13 0
Regulators r1 Good PROPER ratings improve our firm’s relationship
with BAPEDAL
3 100** 9—
r2 Good PROPER ratings will make it easier to comply
with future regulations, which will be more strict
7 50 60
Communities c Bad PROPER ratings increase pressure from
communities living around the factories
39 42 34 6
NGOs n Bad PROPER ratings  increase pressure from non-
governmental organizations
10 44 11 0
News Media m Bad PROPER ratings increase pressure from the news
media
25 43 21 0
Industry Assns. a Bad PROPER ratings increase pressure from industry
associations
3 33 0—
Courts j Bad PROPER ratings increase the chances of court
action by the government
5 100*** 15 0
***significantly different from sample proportion at 1% level
**significantly different from sample proportion at 5% level
*significantly different from sample proportion at 10% levelResources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
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initially rated blue (n = 47).  We omit from the sample plants initially rated green since no plants
have ever improved from green to gold.
For the sample of 92 plants initially rated red or black, the results are qualitatively the
same as those for the full sample: the lion’s share of plants chose as first or second most
important those channels having to do with information, community pressure, the media and ISO
14001 certification, and (discounting channels selected by fewer than 6% of the sample) there
clearly is a simple correlation between environmental performance and concern about ISO 14001
certification.  For the sample of 47 plants initially rated blue, the survey results are slightly
different.  Most notably, there is not a significant correlation between improved environmental
performance and concern about ISO 14001 certification, but there is a significant correlation
between improved environmental performance and concern about shareholders.  In neither
subsample is there a significant correlation between improved environmental performance and
choosing either of the two information channels (t1 and t2).
In summary, our survey results show that in the eyes of the majority of the plants in our
sample, the most important means by which PROPER encourages emissions reductions is
enhancing factory owners’ and managers’ information about their plant’s emissions and
abatement opportunities—the environmental audit effect.  But the perception that this effect is
critical is not correlated with improved environmental performance: non-improvers are more or
less just as likely to have this view as improvers.  Rather, for plants not in compliance with
regulatory standards, improved environmental performance is correlated with concern about
ISO-14001 certification, and for firms that are in compliance, it is correlated with concern about
shareholders.  These results suggest that although the environmental audit effect may be an
important component of the explanation for PROPER’s success, it is only one component.  This
effect probably has an impact by operating in concert with external pressures heightened by
public disclosure.
7.  Conclusion
This paper reviewed the literature to develop a list of channels through which public
disclosure may motivate emissions reductions, developed a simple analytical model to
demonstrate how these channels may operate, and presented data that suggest which of these
channels are important.  Although it runs counter to the focus of the economics literature on
channels external to the firm, our finding that program participants perceive PROPER’s
environmental audit role to be a critical driver of improved environmental performance seems
quite logical.  Firms in industrialized countries typically pay consultants to performResources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
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environmental audits, a practice that implies it is costly to collect environmental performance
data.  Therefore, in countries like Indonesia where formal regulatory pressure is virtually
nonexistent and factories have little incentive to pay these costs, one would expect public
disclosure programs to provide new information about environmental performance to ill-
informed polluters as well as to the public.  What are the policy implications of this finding?
Tietenberg (1998) points out that public disclosure programs entail four elements:  (i)
detecting environmental risks, (ii) assuring reliable information, (iii) disseminating the
information to those at risk from the pollution, and (iv) allowing public- and private-sector
agents to act on the information to create pressures for pollution control.  Our survey data
suggest that a fifth element—disseminating the information to polluters—also plays an important
role in generating emissions reductions and should be deliberately fostered by program
administrators.  Should this be done at the expense of disseminating information to those at risk
from pollution and encouraging them to act on it?  This would have the distinct advantage of
reducing industry resistance to information-based programs.  But our results do not
unambiguously support the conclusion that simply collecting reliable information on
environmental performance and providing it in confidence to polluters would spur significant
emissions reductions.  As noted above, we hypothesize that the environmental audit effect has an
impact on environmental performance by operating in concert with external pressures heightened
by public disclosure.
Further research is needed to gauge the relative importance of the environmental audit
effect and external pressures in public disclosure programs.  As more plants join existing public
disclosure programs and as new programs are set up, researchers have an opportunity to collect
the data that might best address this question—ex ante and ex post firm-specific data on the
intensity of various pressures to abate.
Finally, we note that our finding that ISO 14001 certification bodies and shareholders
may have exerted significant pressures to cut emissions suggests that public disclosure programs
may be particularly effective when targeted at firms that seek to participate in international
certification programs as well as those that are publicly owned.Resources for the Future Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda
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